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This paper examines the issue of principal-principal (PP) conflicts in 
large public listed companies in four ASEAN countries. The PP 
conflicts are regarded as a major problem in emerging markets and 
have attracted considerable attention. The percentage of cash 
dividend of total assets is used to measure the expropriation depicted 
in PP conflicts. A sample of companies with total assets of US$1 
billion are filtered to select those with single/multiple block holders of 
shareholdings concentration equal to or greater than five percent. A 
regression model is estimated with PP conflicts as the dependent 
variable. The findings confirm the existence of PP conflicts, 
suggesting that large shareholders do expropriate company wealth by 
paying higher cash dividends. This expropriation occurs through 
agency perspective and makes it apparent that PP conflicts are a 
major problem in ASEAN markets. 
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JEL Codes: G32, G35 
 
1. Introduction  
 
This paper investigates principal-principal (PP) conflicts using a sample of 194 large 
public listed companies in the ASEAN 4 (Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and the 
Philippines) with total assets equal or greater than US$ 1 billion. The nature of PP 
conflicts has recently been the subject of theoretical discussion in relation to 
developing markets (Dharwadkar, et al. 2000), and is asserted as a major concern. 
Most large companies in ASEAN 4 are characterised by a highly concentrated 
shareholding structure.  It is timely to empirically investigate the extent of PP 
conflicts among these companies, providing the extent of wealth expropriation by 
controlling shareholders in these countries. 
 
Prior research suggests that dividends provide evidence of how controlling 
shareholders expropriate minority shareholders. High dividends reduce the value of 
the company (Lins 2003) and thus negatively impact its growth. Alternatively, lower 
dividend payouts mean that large shareholders prefer to keep earnings within the 
company for their easy access to expropriate funds for their own private benefits, (La 
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Porta, et al. 2000;Pinkowitz, et al. 2006). Determining how high and low dividends 
may reflect PP conflicts requires consideration of a range of other variables. 
 
A convention of examination of high expenses may be thought of as evidence 
suggesting principal-agent (PA) conflicts where misalignment of objectives exists 
between owners and management. This issue may include excessive or insufficient 
investment (Jensen 1986) by the management trusted to run the companies. 
Empirical research into PA conflicts is abundant with proxies used as measures of 
PA cost including assets utilisation ratio (Ang, et al. 2000), discretionary expenditure 
ratio (Singh &Davidson III 2003) and free cash flow and growth (Lehn &Poulsen 
1989). It is argued that the problem in developing markets is between principals or 
shareholders themselves (controlling and minority), and so the conventional view of 
PA conflicts may not be the most applicable explanation. Conflicts between large 
and minority shareholders are more relevant to address the issue of high dividend 
payout in relation to PP conflicts.   
 
From this perspective, PP conflicts are confronted as an expropriation problem. The 
controlling shareholders are allegedly siphoning the company’s resources to benefit 
their personal interests (Johnson, et al. 2000). Typically, it is the minority 
shareholders who suffer financially (Bae, et al. 2002) even if they do still receive 
some amount of dividend returns. In the meantime, the company retains its high 
cash flow while its growth is being compromised, (Ibrahim &Mazlan 2006;Kassim, et 
al. 1993;Rozeff 1982) suggesting the possibility of expropriation.  
 
Presently, there is no consensus concerning the best proxy to be used to measure 
PP conflicts. Dividend behaviour addresses the question of whether the ASEAN 4 
companies suffer from an expropriation problem in a PP context. Consideration in 
conjunction with the magnitude of interaction of cash flows with large shareholders, 
where high/low dividends with signal PP agency conflicts with lower company growth.  
The interaction of large shareholders with the availability of the company’s cash flow 
of a may indicate this relationship and is evident through this study. The paper 
shows that the existence of PP conflicts in ASEAN 4 may occur at shareholdings at 
10 percent due to the existence of higher dividends at this level with a negative sales 
growth.  
 
ASEAN 4 markets are suitable to address the issue of PP conflicts. Minority 
shareholders’ interests remain a concern despite having improved corporate 
standards (Bhasin 2010;Matthias, et al. 2005). Concentrations of ownership in East 
Asia are mostly by single or block shareholders (Claessens, et al. 2000;Lins 2003) 
and may exacerbate the espoused PP conflicts there.   
 
ASEAN 41 was formed in 1967 and consists of Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and 
the Philippines. These countries have a long history of financial markets (Metwalli 
&Tang 2002) and are significant in terms of economic growth in Asia. In 2009, as 
shown in Table I, the ASEAN 4 had a population in excess of 418 million, a total area 
of 3 million square kilometres, and a combined gross domestic product of USD 1.5 
billion.  
 
The success of economic development of the ASEAN 4 is important given its role in 
the development and stability of the Southeast Asia region. The concentration of 
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corporate ownership may impact adversely on the capital markets correctly pricing 
risk through the presence of PP conflicts. Tam and Tan (2007) note the lack of 
success of conventional governance and state there may be potential gains to be 
had through more market regulation. This study proposes to encourage the 
regulators to utilise dividend payout as the corporate governance mechanism for 
monitoring purposes in the light of this concern.  
 
Table I: Basic ASEAN 4 indicators 
Country 
Total land area Total population 
Gross domestic product 
at current prices 
km
2
 thousand US$ million 
Indonesia 1,860,360 231,369.5 546,527.0 
Malaysia 330,252 28,306.7 193,107.7 
Philippines 300,000 92,226.6 161,357.6 
Thailand 513,120 66,903.0 264,322.8 
ASEAN 3,003,732 418,805.8 1,499,400.8 
 
(Source: ASEAN Finance and Macro-economic Surveillance Unit Database,  
ASEAN Merchandise Trade Statistics Database) 
 
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
 
2.1 Agency Theory  
 
Research based on agency theory has been extensively conducted, especially in 
advanced economies as corporations become more dispersed or “divorced from the 
management” (Berle &Means 1968). The core issue is monitoring and bonding costs 
(Jensen &Meckling 1976) which arise due to divergence in the alignment of owner 
(principals) and management (agents) interests. Managers may take advantage of 
their position to extract direct or indirect financial benefits from the company at the 
expense of maximising shareholder wealth. 
 
Ownership of companies in developing countries is more concentrated. For instance, 
Claessens, Djankov, & Lang (2000) find that a single shareholders control more than 
two-thirds of companies across nine Asian countries, and more than half the 
companies are controlled by family members. Truong & Heaney (2007) list the 
distribution of the largest shareholders in 37 countries2 including the ASEAN 4.  
 
Research in the agency context suggests that large shareholders are a good 
mechanism to reduce agency problems as they have greater incentives and more 
resources to efficiently monitor a company’s performance (Holderness 2003;Jensen 
&Meckling 1976). However, in a system with low legal protection for shareholders, 
large shareholdings give rise to other problems associated with large shareholders 
taking advantage off minority shareholder investment (La Porta, et al. 2000) through 
high dividend payments. Controlling shareholders can also transfer assets out of 
companies to satisfy their own benefits (Johnson, et al. 2000). These authors claim 
that assets can be “looted out” through asset sales, contracts which are 
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advantageous to the controlling shareholders or other financial transactions at the 
expense of the minority shareholders.  Rather than suffering from the PA conflicts, 
these companies experience PP conflicts (Dharwadkar, et al. 2000).  
 
2.2 Principal-principal (PP) conflicts 
 
Broadly, PP refers to conflicts between controlling shareholders and minority 
shareholders in a company. Large shareholders may use their voting rights to control 
the company for their own interests while other dispersed shareholders and 
stakeholders bear the cost (Johnson, et al. 2000). Defined as expropriation, this PP 
conflicts can be evidenced by making inefficient investment, having lower firm 
valuations and lower or higher levels of dividend payouts (Faccio, et al. 2001;Young, 
et al. 2008). 
 
PP conflicts are potentially more detrimental in emerging economies such as the 
ASEAN 4. Faccio et al., (2001) reiterate that problems in East Asian governance are 
more severe than in mature markets due to the extraordinary concentration of control. 
Weak legal protection for minority shareholders in this region results in a more 
vulnerable status for minority shareholders (Dharwadkar, et al. 2000;La Porta, et al. 
1997) than would be the case in more mature markets with stronger legislation.  
 
Empirical investigations of PP conflicts are not plentiful. Recent research such as Su, 
Xu, & Phan Su (2008) use board of directors’ compensation, board size and the 
proportion of independent directors in Chinese listed companies to measure PP 
conflicts. Board compensation is essentially audited and monitored by the audit 
committee and may not reflect the true nature of expropriation by large shareholders. 
This current research paper proposes that dividend payment as a direct payout to 
shareholders is a more appropriate measure of PP conflicts. 
 
2.3 Principal-Principal (PP), cash dividend, cash flow and growth.  
 
As previously discussed, large shareholders are needed to monitor managers and to 
search for ways to better the firm (Shleifer &Vishny 1986). Agency considerations 
are the most likely to answer the famous dividend puzzle (Black 1976); how 
companies choose their dividend policies (La Porta, et al. 2000). In an effective 
system of legal protection of shareholders, large shareholders are monitored by 
minority shareholders through dividend payments (La Porta, et al. 2000). 
 
In the agency context, dividends play an important role in the reduction of PA cost. 
By paying dividends, corporate earnings are returned to investors and are no longer 
available to management to benefit themselves (Rozeff 1982). This corresponds to 
the free cash flow theory developed by Easterbrook (1984) and discussed 
extensively in later work (Bena &Hanousek 2005;Gugler &Yurtoglu 2003;Jensen 
1986).  
 
However, investors in emerging markets are particularly more concerned about 
controlling shareholders expropriating cash holdings via cash dividends for their own 
private benefits (Chiou, et al. 2010). Faccio et al., (2001) explain the relationship 
between dividend payout to controlling shareholders in two regions; Western Europe 
and East Asia. They contend that companies with large shareholders in East Asia 
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are forced to increase dividends as the potential for expropriation increases with 
higher shareholder concentration. 
 
La Porta et al., (2000) argue that companies with weaker shareholder protection pay 
lower dividends.  PP conflicts may also explain how expropriation can be explicated 
through lower dividend payments. Large shareholders expropriate by paying out 
lower dividends to keep resources in the company and within their control 
(Easterbrook 1984;Faccio, et al. 2001;La Porta, et al. 2000) and likely to accumulate 
more cash within the company (Mancinelli &Ozkan 2006).  
 
The question is, therefore, do higher or lower cash dividends implicate expropriation? 
This research conjures that the propensity of large shareholders to expropriate 
depends on the availability of cash in the company.  It is also important to show that 
lower sales growth may show the negative effects of PP conflicts. Sales growth is an 
important indicator of whether companies will reach their financial objectives, be 
competitive (Kaplan &Norton 1993;Kaplan &Norton 1996) and achieve better future 
prospects (Chiou, et al. 2010). Brush, Bromiley, & Hendrickx (2000) find in their 
study that cash flow increases sales growth which leads to better performance.  
 
In line with the above discussion, a main hypothesis emerges and this can be sub-
divided into four sets as follows.  
 
Main Hypothesis – The higher the stake owned by a shareholder in a company, the 
higher/lower dividends (interaction of shareholding percentage with cash flows) to 
shareholders and lower growth sales growth.  
 
Sub-Hypothesis 1 – Companies with shareholders who own more than 5% stake in 
the company tend to pay higher dividends with lower sales growth. 
Sub-Hypothesis 2 – Companies with shareholders who own more than 10% stake in 
the company tend to pay higher dividends with lower sales growth. 
Sub-Hypothesis 3 – Companies with shareholders who own more than 15% stake in 
the company tend to pay higher dividends with lower sales growth. 
Sub-Hypothesis 4 – Companies with shareholders who own more than 20% stake in 
the company tend to pay higher dividends with lower sales growth. 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
 
Data for public listed companies are collected from ASEAN 4 countries, i.e., 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and The Philippines.  As discussed in the previous 
section, ASEAN 4 markets are characterised by having extreme concentrated 
shareholdings in their public listed companies and weak legal protection for minority 
shareholders. Companies with under US$1 billion in total assets as at 31 December 
2009 are excluded. These considerations are taken because this paper is to 
examine large ASEAN 4 companies and the availability of comprehensive ownership 
data for the year 2009. Companies that do not pay dividend are also included to 
avoid selection bias in using cross country comparison data (Deshmukh 2003).  
 
A total of 212 companies representing a range of industries from the four countries 
are selected and listed in Appendix 1. These large companies represent about 10% 
of overall companies in ASEAN 4. More importantly, they consist of 74.9% 
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(US$533.2 billion) in total market capitalisation of the four countries. Data used for 
analysis and comparative purposes are drawn from the Worldscope database of 
Thomson One Banker. Eighteen (3 missing and 15 incomplete data) companies 
were dropped due to unavailability of data, which gives the final sample of 194 
companies.  
 
The assumptions related to regression analysis were examined before proceeding 
with the analysis of the data. The initial distribution exhibited heteroscedasticity, as 
with most of cross-sectional data (Green 1993), and a multicollinearity problem. It is 
not surprising that the large shareholder data indicates the presence of 
multicollinearity in the model since the different levels of large shareholdings 
comprise additive functions of constituent variables. Dummy variables were allotted 
to control the various levels of shareholdings to eliminate the problem. This is not 
necessary for the 5% and higher shareholdings, since all companies in the sample 
contain shareholdings at these levels. 
 
Table II indicates the computation of variance inflation factors (VIFs) for the mean-
centered variables are below the acceptable cut-off point of 10 suggesting the 
absence of multicollinearity for Models 1 and 2 (Significant models). Other 
independent variables are not highly correlated (less than 0.5 degree), as shown in 
Table III.  
 
Table II: Variance Inflation Factor (VIFs) 
 
  
Model     
     1 
Model    
      2 
Variable VIF VIF 
CFls5 5.43  
CFls10  7.08 
Ls5  3.15 
dumLs10 1.38  
dumLs15 2.78 2.45 
dumLs20 2.51 2.98 
CFSales 5.64 6.43 
LgTotAssets 2.95 2.92 
LgSALES 2.7 2.7 
ROA 2.26 2.26 
PricetoBook 1.46 1.47 
TDTA 1.37 1.39 
Beta 1.31 1.43 
Industry 1.3 1.31 
EBITtoInt 1.15 1.15 
SalesGrowth 1.13 1.14 
Mean VIF 2.38 2.7 
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The next procedure is to employ both OLS and robust regression techniques to 
eliminate the problems of heteroscedasticity and any extreme outliers (Chen 
2001;Hamilton 2009;Yaffee 2002).  
 
The robust regression estimates are obtained by performing with M-estimators 
(maximum likelihood) in STATA software (Hamilton 2009;StataCorp 2009) or by 
iteratively weighting the observations using the residuals from the previous 
regression. The software uses median absolute deviation about the median residual 
divided by a constant (Huber 1981). The first regression begins with ordinary least 
square (OLS) where any influential observations will be downweighted and cases 
with large residuals are assigned zero weights. This will eliminate any influence to 
the results. The second step uses Huber weights and biweights where the final 
convergence will produce one solution. Due to the presence of zero dividends from 
various companies, a Tobit regression was also conducted. However since no 
difference was found using this analysis, results using OLS and robust regression 
are reported. 
 
PP conflicts are measured as the percentage of cash dividend to total assets.  
Consistent with prior research, the cash dividend is apportioned to total assets to 
reduce biasness due to different accounting conventions as well as other 
manipulation by the large shareholders (Gadhoum 2000). Transformation to square 
root of CDTA is done to have better explanatory and predictive power (Kane 
&Meade 1998) since it reduces the tails of exponential distribution of data. Similar to 
Gadhoum (2000), a continuous function of stock concentration is used to signify the 
effective controls the large shareholders (LS) have in the companies. 
 
Large shareholders are defined as shareholders who hold at least 5% and up to 20% 
of total shares in the company (Claessens, et al. 1999;Claessens, et al. 2000;La 
Porta, et al. 1999). The shareholders are then categorised into four types being 
shareholders with 5% and more (Ls5), 10% and more (Ls10), 15% and more (Ls15) 
and 20% and more (Ls20). The rationale for these bands is to reflect levels of 
percentage of shareholdings reported in previous studies (Shleifer &Vishny 1986).  
 
The interaction terms between cash flow and large shareholdings are to distinguish 
the different impacts of control between the shareholdings. The effect of having more 
cash within the companies is modified with different concentration of large 
shareholders. The variables used in the study are presented in Table IV. 
Consideration was given to an extensive range of potential variables. However, 
those considered extraneous are not included (Mohd, et al. 1995). 
The final model is specified as below: 
 
CDTA = α + β1Interaction terms + β2SalesGrowth + β3LgSALES + 
β4LgTotAssets + β5PricetoBook + β6ROA + β7TDTA + β8Beta + 
β9EBITtoInt + β10CFSales + β11dummy + β12Industry + ε 
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Table III: Correlations of variables 
 
                  1    2    3      4       5       6       7       8       9      10      11      12 13    14 
 
1        CDTA   1.0000 
2       CFls5   0.2907  1.0000 
3      CFls10   0.2963  0.9808  1.0000 
4      CFls15   0.3025  0.9614  0.9838  1.0000 
5      CFls20   0.2917  0.9409  0.9649  0.9828  1.0000 
6 SalesGrowth  -0.0907  0.1855  0.1753  0.1471  0.1373  1.0000 
7    LogSALES   0.3016 -0.2415 -0.2302 -0.2188 -0.1944 -0.1213  1.0000 
8 LgTotAssets  -0.1475  0.0858  0.0795  0.0549  0.0651  0.0360  0.4833  1.0000 
9 PricetoBook   0.5132  0.1418  0.1558  0.1689  0.1670  0.0192  0.2829  0.0305  1.0000  
10        ROA   0.7025  0.2576  0.2604  0.2664  0.2603  0.0402  0.2045 -0.2767  0.4571  1.0000 
11       TDTA  -0.0821  0.0076 -0.0412 -0.0438 -0.0555  0.0242 -0.0177 -0.2507  0.0236 -0.0174  1.0000 
12       Beta  -0.3448 -0.3149 -0.2978 -0.2851 -0.2800 -0.0796 -0.1496 -0.1642 -0.3159 -0.2612  0.0148  1.0000 
13  EBITtoInt   0.2007 -0.0289 -0.0221 -0.0147 -0.0158 -0.0596  0.0879 -0.1001  0.2270  0.1650 -0.1650 -0.0470 1.0000 
14    CFSales   0.2823  0.8819  0.8374  0.7998  0.7761  0.1447 -0.2035  0.1861  0.1313  0.2492  0.0147 -0.3200 -0.0398  1.0000 
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4. Results and Discussion 
 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
The descriptive statistics for the full sample of the companies are presented in Table 
V.  In terms of characteristics, ASEAN 4 large companies do not show much 
variation, as indicated by the standard deviations. All of the companies in the sample 
are owned by a block-holder with at least 5% percent or more shareholding. 
Interestingly; 64% of the companies have large shareholdings of 5% or more, 
making them, the shareholders, very powerful. An average 48% of the companies in 
ASEAN 4 have large shareholders who hold 20% percent or more shareholdings.  
 
Table IV: Summary of the dependent and independent variables 
 
Dependant variable 
Cash dividend 
ratio (CDTA) 
Cash dividend/Total Assets 
Independent variable 
SalesGrowth Sales growth (1 year) 
Sales (log) Log of total sales 
Total Assets (log) Log of total assets 
PricetoBook Market Price to book value of share 
ROA Ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to total assets 
TDTA Total Assets to Total Debt 
BETA Beta or risk of share (Bradley, et al. 1998) 
EBITtoInt Earnings before interest and tax to interest expenses 
CFSales Free cash flow to sales 
Industry General industry classification 
Ls5 Total percentage of shares at 5 % and above 
dumLs10 Dummy variable 1 for total percentage of shares at 10% and above, 0 
otherwise 
dumLs15 Dummy variable for total percentage of shares at 15% and above, 0 
otherwise 
dumLs20 Dummy variable for total percentage of shares at 20% and above, 0 
otherwise 
Interaction terms 
CFLs5 Cash Flow to Sales multiply with Ls5 
CFLs10 Cash Flow to Sales multiply with Ls10 
CFLs15 Cash Flow to Sales multiply with Ls15 
CFLs20 Cash Flow to Sales multiply with Ls20 
 
Earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) is an exception showing large differences 
within the companies. Some companies in the sample, e.g. Krungthai Card Public of 
company of Thailand has almost 85% in total debt to total assets while Genting 
Malaysia Berhad does not report any. The sales growth of the companies on 
average is 6.5 percent. Companies in Asean 4 pay out cash dividends at 2% of their 
total assets and the maximum companies paid out in 2009 is 29% of their total 
assets.  
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4.2 Empirical Results 
 
Table VI reports results for OLS and robust regression of four models depicting 
different levels of PP conflicts and their explanatory variables. The coefficients by 
both methods are stable with different company sizes (Total Assets and Total Sales). 
As explained in the previous section, this discussion will focus on the robust 
regression results as the models have satisfied the regression assumptions. F tests 
at significant p-value indicate that all specifications or models are significant as a 
whole.  
 
Table V: Descriptive statistics for the 194 large Asean 4   companies 
      
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
CDTA 0.0201858 0.036526 0 0.290796 
CFls5 13.56592 17.73786 -139.003 112.2278 
CFls10 12.15891 17.32682 -139.003 112.2278 
CFls15 11.07456 16.80479 -139.003 112.2278 
CFls20 10.33838 16.46341 -139.003 112.2278 
SalesGrowth 6.475467 30.55515 -45.4649 219.525 
LgSALES 8.999451 0.470446 7.743783 10.67739 
LgTotAssets 9.534518 0.443687 9.002742 10.94438 
PricetoBook 1.861842 1.584133 0.13557 11.222 
ROA 5.752961 6.291127 -11.4876 31.35616 
TDTA 26.19883 19.79864 0 84.93256 
Beta 1.187455 0.572702 -0.192 3.61012 
EBITtoInt 38.33716 257.6767 -23.5707 3394.5 
CFSales 20.18854 25.76887 -240.406 116.7702 
Ls5 0.6369157 0.22566 0.061 100 
Ls10 0.5703328 0.251182   
Ls15 0.51804 0.262369   
Ls20 0.4818585 0.275105   
 
The main hypothesis predicts agency theory with higher dividend and lower 
company growth. The robust results for Models 1 and 2 support this hypothesis but 
are statistically insignificant in Models 3 and 4. By controlling the other stakes of 
different levels of shareholdings, the analysis finds statistically significant results for 
the interaction term of cash flows at 5% and 10% stake with PP conflicts. Models 1 
and 2 also support the negative relationship with CDTA and sales growth (p < 0.05). 
This may indicate that, with shareholdings at 5% and 10%, a strong control in the 
company may enable them (the large shareholders) to extract large resources 
through other avenues from the companies.  
 
The insignificant results for Models 3 and 4 at shareholdings of 15% and more 
require further insights. Some studies have shown that large shareholders may 
actually reduce PA problems (Agrawal &Knoeber 1996;Holderness 2003) but since 
this research focuses on PP conflicts, this can be a question for future research. 
 
Banchit & Locke  
11 
 
With respect to the rest of the control variables, the coefficient of total sales is 
positive and statistically significantly across all models (p< 0.01).  The results for 
independent relationships are consistent with results from previous studies. These 
positive coefficients show that bigger (La Porta, et al. 2000) and more profitable 
companies pay higher dividends. Also, lower geared companies (Truong &Heaney 
2007) and riskier companies (Farinha &Lopez-De-Foronda 2009) seem to have 
higher cash dividend payouts. These findings may indicate that PP conflicts are 
more prominent because shareholders are at an advantage to expropriate, as these 
companies have lower debt and less riskier than listed companies.. This is similar to 
findings by Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) who suggest that debt ratio plays a 
positive role in curbing agency problems. Since this research is focussing in PP 
conflicts, it may conclude that debt should also be able to reduce this problem.  
 
The above results show that PP conflicts do exist in ASEAN 4 countries. The positive 
signs of cash dividend to interaction of cash flows with large shareholders at 5% and 
10% shareholdings support the asset expropriation view. These findings suggest that 
the presence of large shareholders does affect company’s cash flow via increased 
dividends and has a negative impact on growth.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The paper contributes to the empirical investigations of emerging markets focusing 
on PP conflicts.  However, this research is limited to cross sectional one year data 
with a limited number of companies. Findings suggest that PP conflicts are a major 
problem in Asia and call for more research focus. PP conflicts in this study are 
measured by using cash dividends made to large shareholders with interaction of 
cash flows, to show the cost of expropriation depicted in PP conflicts.   
 
Agency theory is used to test this notion, but focuses on the misappropriation of cash 
by agents or principals who control the companies they run. A sample of 194 
companies in the ASEAN 4 (Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines) has 
been considered to test and seems to support the notion that PP conflicts in the 
agency theory perspective are consistent with prior studies of other emerging 
markets. The levels of percentage for large shareholders expropriating are at 5% 
and 10% stakes with what may be a detrimental impact to the companies’ growth. 
This study also proposes to encourage regulators to utilise dividend payout as the 
corporate governance mechanism for monitoring purposes in light of this concern.  
 
The other direct implication of these findings is the importance of investors’ 
performance with regard to PP conflicts in Asian markets. Minority shareholders are 
at risk of expropriation and this situation calls for urgency in stronger investor 
protection. There do not appear to be any desirable solutions for resolving PP 
conflicts in emerging economies and particularly in the ASEAN 4. Further empirical 
research in this area will definitely bring more perspective to this unique problem.  
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Table VI: Regression analysis explaining the effect of dividend as proxy to PP conflicts in ASEAN 4 
OLS and OLS with robust cross-sectional of CDTA on explanatory variables. 
         ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                            Model 1                Model 2            Model 3         Model 4 
                         OLS     OLS(robust)  OLS   OLS(robust)    OLS   OLS(robust)   OLS    OLS(robust)        
         ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
          CFls5          0.001     0.001                                                                
                         (1.22)   (2.02)*                                                               
          CFls10                             0.002     0.002                                            
                                            (2.46)*   (2.37)*                                           
          CFls15                                                 0.001     0.001                        
                                                                 (1.92)    (1.73)                       
          CFls20                                                                     0.001     0.001    
                                                                                     (1.33)    (1.53)  
          SalesGrowth   -0.0003  -0.0003   -0.0003   -0.0003   -0.0003   -0.0003   -0.0003    -0.0003   
                        (2.34)*   (2.34)*   (2.07)*   (2.07)*    (1.94)    (1.97)    (1.92)    (1.92)   
          LgSALES        0.082     0.088     0.079     0.082     0.079     0.081     0.079     0.082    
                        (5.24)**  (5.81)**  (5.11)**  (5.39)**  (5.10)**  (5.31)**  (5.02)**  (5.40)**  
          LgTotAssets    -0.075    -0.072    -0.077    -0.071    -0.075    -0.071    -0.076    -0.071   
                        (4.48)**  (4.40)**  (4.65)**  (4.39)**  (4.48)**  (4.30)**  (4.52)**  (4.36)**  
          PricetoBook    0.012     0.005     0.012     0.006     0.012     0.006     0.012     0.005    
                        (3.57)**   (1.52)   (3.58)**   (1.78)   (3.55)**   (1.86)   (3.59)**   (1.54)   
          ROA            0.005     0.006     0.005     0.006     0.005     0.006     0.005     0.006    
                        (5.13)**  (6.34)**  (5.26)**  (6.33)**  (5.27)**  (6.26)**  (5.23)**  (6.30)**  
          TDTA           -0.001    -0.001    -0.001    -0.001    -0.001    -0.001    -0.001    -0.001   
                        (3.15)**  (2.55)*   (3.09)**  (2.41)*   (3.05)**  (2.47)*   (3.08)**  (2.42)*   
          Beta           -0.017    -0.015    -0.023    -0.019    -0.022    -0.018    -0.021    -0.018   
                         (1.91)    (1.71)   (2.60)*   (2.18)*   (2.41)*   (2.07)*   (2.33)*   (2.00)*   
          EBITtoInt      0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000    
                         (0.15)    (0.49)    (0.07)    (0.42)    (0.13)    (0.42)    (0.12)    (0.55)   
          CFSales        0.001     0.001     0.000     0.000     0.001     0.001     0.001     0.001    
                         (1.83)    (1.19)    (0.60)    (0.58)    (1.55)    (1.52)   (2.24)*    (1.97)   
          Industry       0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     -0.000   
                         (0.39)    (0.03)    (0.58)    (0.35)    (0.52)    (0.14)    (0.47)    (0.10)   
          Ls5                                -0.082    -0.048    -0.056    -0.028    -0.044    -0.021   
                                            (2.39)*    (1.42)    (1.87)    (0.97)    (1.51)    (0.75)   
          dumLs10        -0.005    -0.000                        -0.006    -0.004    -0.004    -0.003   
                         (0.14)    (0.01)                        (0.17)    (0.10)    (0.12)    (0.07)   
          dumLs15        -0.010    -0.012    -0.011    -0.012    0.004     -0.007    0.004     -0.007   
                         (0.35)    (0.43)    (0.42)    (0.47)    (0.16)    (0.31)    (0.18)    (0.32)   
          dumLs20        -0.003    -0.007    0.020     0.006                                            
                         (0.13)    (0.36)    (0.89)    (0.27)                                           
          Constant       0.048     -0.033    0.122     0.037     0.096     0.033     0.103     0.029    
                         (0.40)    (0.28)    (1.00)    (0.31)    (0.79)    (0.27)    (0.84)    (0.24)   
           R2            0.65       0.66      0.66      0.66      0.66      0.65      0.65      0.65    
        F-statistic      23.73 24.75     24.87     24.72     24.35 24.10     23.96    23.85 
        Adj. R2            64.99    63.39            62.88               62.48 
             N           194        194       194        194       194       194       194       194   
      P-value         0.000      0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000      0.000     0.000     0.000 
Notes: Statistically Significant level at * p<0.05; ** p<0.01. t-values are in parentheses below the coefficient estimates.
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Endnotes 
                                            
1
 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (commonly known as ASEAN) was formed on August 8, 1967.  The 
other six states beyond the scope of this study are Singapore (1967), Brunei (1984), Vietnam (1995), Laos 
(1997), Myanmar (1997) and Cambodia (1999). 
 
2
 Greater concentration of ownership in 2004: Indonesia (52.85%), Malaysia (33.18%), Thailand (37.2%) and 
the Philippines (48.76%).   
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Appendix 1. 
 
     Country   Frequency     Percentage 
 
Indonesia           52        24.53 
Malaysia          68        32.08 
The Philippines           41        19.34 
Thailand           51        24.06 
 
Total           212       100.00 
 
 
